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NOTE AND COMMENT
ly, the parents of a deceased child, though not actually de-
pendent upon the deceased at the time of the injury, are al-
lowed compensation." Thus the harsh result of denying a non-
dependent parent any recovery for the death of a minor is
avoided, and substituted therefor is certain relief under the
Act. This is in keeping with the theory of Workmen's Com-
pensation Acts, to afford a humanitarian, speedy and econom-
ical method by which compensation might be made, allowing
the industry to which the employee contributed his labor to
bear the expense which eventually is borne by the community
at large by reason of the cost thereof being added to the cost
of goods or services supplied.
It is hoped that the Legislature will give serious attention
to this subject in the not too distant future.
Albert C. Angstman.
time of his death, to a total minimum award of one thousand
dollars .... "
"Double v. Iowa-Nebraska Coal Co. (1924) 198 Iowa 1351, 201 N. W.
97; Pierce's Case, note 6, supra.
RIGHTS OF EMPLOYEE AND EMPLOYER AGAINST A
TORTIOUS THIRD PARTY UNDER WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION ACTS
The Workmen's Compensation Laws and court decisions
of 47' states recognize the right of an injured employee to re-
cover damages against a negligent third party, not under the
act, who has caused the injury.' These "third party liability"
statutes, as they are called, may be classified into five major
categories:'
1. Those denying compensation altogether, thus leaving
.the employee to his remedy against the third party.'
2. Those allowing the employee to recover compensation
only but requiring the employer to prosecute the suit
'Mississippi remains the only state not having adopted some form of
Workmen's Compensation Act.
2New Hampshire, Ohio, and West Virginia have no third party liability
statutes in their acts, but their courts nevertheless recognize this
right.
'See DODD, ADMINISTRATION OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, p. 607.
'Wyoming, §124-109, Wyo. Rev. Stats., 1931, Suppi. of 1940. It is
to be observed, however, that when the employee is injured by a neg-
lgent third party while engaged in an extra-hazardous occupation, he
is permitted by this statute the dual remedy characteristic of the
group in Note 8, infra.
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against the third party, any excess over the amount
of compensation being paid to the employee.
3. Those requiring the employee to elect between com-
pensation or the third party suit. Under this type
of statute, the employee's election to sue the third
party releases the employer, while an election to take
compensation subrogates the employer to the cause of
action against the third party.!
4. Those similar to No. 3 except that if the employee
elects to sue, the employer remains liable for any de-
ficiency up to the amount of what would have been
due under the compensation statute.'
5. Those where the employee may simultaneously accept
compensation and sue the third party, but the em-
ployer is almost universally subrogated to the extent
of compensation liability out of the third party re-
covery."
'Missouri §3309, Rev. Stats. of Mo., 1929; and North Carolina, §8081 (r),
8081(r), No. Car. Code of 1939. The latter state allows the employee
to sue if the employer fails to act within six months.
'Massachusetts, §15, Chp. 152, Gen'l. Laws of Mass.; Florida, §39,
Chp. 17481, LAWS OF FLORIDA, 1935; Idaho, §43-1004, Idaho Code
Anno., 1932; Maine, §24, Chp. 55, Rev. Stats. of Maine, 1930; North
Dakota, §396a20, Suppl. to Comp. Laws of N. D., 1913-25; Texas,
§6a, Art. 8307, Vernon's Texas Civil Stats. (1941). Vermont §6511,
Public Laws of Vt., 1933; Kansas, §44-504, Genl. Stats. of Kansas,
1935; Michigan, §8454, Comp. Laws of Mich. 1929; Delaware, §6108,
Rev. Code of Dela., 1935; South Carolina, p. 1237, ACTS OF SOUTH
CAROLINA, 1936; Maryland, §72, Art. 101, Anno. Code of Md., (1939);
Utah, §42-1-58, Rev. Stats. of Utah, 1933; Virginia, §1887 (12), Va.
Code of 1930; Oregon, §49-1814, Ore. Code Anno., 1935. By the Oregon
statute, however, if the employee is engaged in extra-hazardous em-
ployment when injured by the third party, the Insurer remains liable
for any deficiency as of those states grouped in Note 7, infra.
'New York, §29, Chp. 66, Cahill's Consol. Laws of N. Y., 1930; Ari-
zona, §56-949, Ariz. Code Anno., 1939; Colorado, §366, Ch. 97, Colo.
Stats. Anno., 1935; Nevada, §2687, Nev. Comp. Laws, 1929; Washing-
ton, §7675, Vol. 8, Remington's Rev. Stats. of Wash., (1932). Okla-
homa, §13368, Okla., Stats., 1931.
'Montana, R. C. M., 1935, §2839; Ch. 230, §1, LAWS OF MONTANA
1943; Alabama, §7587, Code of Ala. 1923; California, Act 4749, §29,
Codes and Genl. Laws of Calif., Consol. Suppl. 1925-27; Arkansas,
Work. Comp. Law, §40, Ark. Stat. Suppl, 1944; Connecticut, §5231,
Genl. Stats. of Conn., Rev. of 1930; Georgia, §3154(2) (d) Ga. Code,
1926; Illinois, Ch. 48, §166, Ill. Anno. Stats., Perm. Ed. (1941) ;, Indiana,
§40-2229, Burns Ind. Stats. Anno. 1933; Kentucky, §4890, Carroll's Ky.
Stats. 1930; Iowa §1382, Code of Ia. 1931; New Mexico, §156-124, N. M.
Stats. Anno. 1929; Louisiana, §4397, La. Genl. Stats. 1939; Wisconsin,
§102.29, Wis. Stats., 1939; Minnesota, §4272-5, Mason's Minn. Stats.
1927; South Dakota, §64.0301, S. D. Code of 1939; Nebraska, §48-118,
Comp. Stats. of Nebr. 1929; Pennsylvania, §671, Purdon's Penn. Stats.
Anno. 1931; Rhode Island, Ch. 300, Art. III, §20, Genl. Laws of R. I.
1938; Tennessee, §6865, Code of Tenn. 1932.
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Montana is one of the 20 states adhering to the liberal
policy of the fifth group, which is the subject matter of this
article. This group itself, however, may be subdivided into
three types:
1. That which gives the employer a lien on the net re-
covery up to full subrogation of the amount paid as
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation
Act.'
2. That which makes full subrogation possible, but
where the employer and the employee share the re-
covery on a percentage basis (any excess over the
compensation from the employer's percentage going
to the employee also).*
3. That which allows only partial subrogation, although
the employer is allowed a first lien to that extent.
Montana is the lone representative of this last sub-cate-
gory, as evidenced by reference to Section 2839, R. C. M. 1935.11
'All states In Note 8 except Wisconsin, Arkansas, and Montana.
"'Wisconsin and Arkansas.
"§2839 reads in full:
"Where both the employer and employee have elected to come under
this act, the provisions of this act shall be exclusive, and such election
shall *be held to be a surrender by such employer and such employee,
as between themselves, of their right to any other method, form or
kind of compensation, or determination thereof, or to any other com-
pensation, or kind of determination thereof, or cause of action, action
at law, suit in equity, or statutory or common-law right or remedy,
or proceeding whatever, for or on account of any personal injury to or
death of such employee, except as such rights may be hereinafter spe-
cifically granted; and such election shall bind the employee himself,
and in case of death shall bind his personal representative, and all
persons having any right or claim to compensation for his injury or
death, as well as the employer, and those conducting his business dur-
ing liquidation, bankruptcy, or insolvency. Provided, that whenever
such employee shall receive an injury while performing the duties of
his employment and such injury or injuries, so received by such em-
ployee, are caused by the act or omission of some persons or corpora-
tions other than his employer, and where the cause of such injury has
no direct connection with his regular employment, and does not arise
out of or necessarily follow as an incident thereof, then such employee,
or in case of his death his heirs or personal representatives, shall, in
addition to the right to receive compensation under the workmen's
compensation act, have a right to prosecute any cause of action he
may have for damages against such persons or corporations, causing
such injury. In the event said employee shall prosecute an action for
damages for or on account of such Injuries so received, he shall not
be deprived of his right to receive compensation but such compensa-
tion shall be received by him in addition to and independent of his
right to bring action for such damages, provided, that in the event
said employee, or in case of his death, his personal representative,
shall bring such action, then the employer or insurance carrier paying
such compensation shall be subrogated only to the extent of either
3
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This statute's unprecedented" liberality in permitting only
limited subrogation was greatly extended (prior to its amend-
ment in 1943)" by the Montana Supreme Court in the case of
Hardware Mutual Casualty Co. vs. Butler"4 by its construction
of the following provision:
"... the employer or insurance carrier paying such
compensation shall be subrogated to the extent of 1/2 of the
gross amount received by such employee as compensation
under the workmen's compensation laws. . . " if such ac-
tion is brought by the employee within six months.'
The court held that "gross amount received" meant that
money actually received by the employee as compensation to
the date of settlement of the action,"6 and not the amount of
compensation "receivable" or "payable" under the award."
one-half (%) of the gross amount received by such employee as com-
pensation under the workmen's compensation law, or one-half (/2)
of the amount recovered and paid to such employee in settlement of,
or by judgment in said action, whichever is the lesser amount. All
expense of prosecuting such action shall be borne by the employee, or
if the employee shall fail to bring such action or make settlement of
his cause of action within six (6) months from the time such Injury
is received, the employer or insurance carrier who pays such compen-
sation thereafter bring such action and thus become entitled to all
of the amount received from the prosecution of such action up to the
amount paid the employee under the Workmen's Compensation Act,
and all over that amount shall be paid to the employee. In the event
have been fully determined at the time of such employee shall receive
settlement of his action, prosecuted as aforesaid, then the industrial
accident board shall determine what proportion of such settlement the
insurance carrier would be entitled to receive under its rights of sub-
rogation and such finding of the board shall be conclusive. Such
employer or insurance carrier shall have a lien on such cause of action
for one-half (%) of the amount paid to such employee as compensation
under the Workmen's Compensation Act or one-half (1) of the amount
recovered and paid to such employee In settlement of, or by judgment
in said action, whichever is the lesser amount, which shall be a first
lien thereon."
"Some doubt may be cast on the use of this word by reference to
§3154(2) (d), Georgia Code, prior to its amendment in 1922, when it ap-
pears that the employee was permitted to recover both compensation
and damages from a negligent third party without subrogation to the
employer.
"See Notes 8 and 11.
14(1944) .... Mont-... 148 P. (2d)563.
"By the wording of §2839, if the employee fails to sue within the
six months, then the employer is subrogated to the cause of action and
from any recovery resulting is entitled to reimbursement ". . . up to the
amount paid the employee under the Workmen's Compensation Act. .. "
"In the principal case, as subsequently appears, the plaintiff settled out
of court. If the case had gone to judgment, presumably the court
would have held that the employer was subrogated to the amount of
compensation actually received by the employee at the date of com-
mencement of the action.
"The meaning of "amount received" and "amount paid" have long been
4
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In the principal case, Butler while in course of employ-
ment for the employer, was fatally injured when struck by an
automible driven by the defendant third party. Plaintiff wife
of deceased recovered as compensation to be paid under the
act $8,000, payable in installments. Before six months had ex-
pired, and after having received $798 as compensation under
the act, plaintiff settled with the third party's insurer for
$2750. The Industrial Accident Board, insurer under the com-
pensation act, contended that it was entitled to the entire
amount, since 1/2 the compensation to be paid under the act
was $4,000. In the Montana Supreme Court decision, this con-
tention was also maintained by Justice Morris in his dissent.
But the majority of the court upheld the plaintiff's argument
that the Board was entitled only to 1/2 the actual compensa-
tion received to the date of settlement, or $399."
In 1943, the controversial provision was amended to read:
".... . the employer or insurance carrier paying such
compensation shall be subrogated only to the extent of either
one-half (1/2) of the gross amount received by such em-
ployee as compensation under the workmen's compensation
in controversy, with holdings both with and against the principal case.
Probably the correct test, set out in Realty Associates Securities Corp.
vs. O'Connor, (1935) 295 U. S. 295; 79 L. Ed. 1446, is that the term
"must have a sensible construction according to the facts." See also
Hamburg vs. Cundill, (1928) 247 N. Y. 119, 159 N. E. 882.
"A separate controversy arose in the principal case over the question
whether the term "expenses" Included attorney's fees. The provision
of §2893 contested read: "All expense of prosecuting such action
shall be borne by the employee. . ." The court held that expenses did
not in this case include such fees; that all parties benefiting by the
attorney's efforts should share in the expense as an equitable prin-
ciple; also that general statute §8993, R. C. M., providing for an at-
torney's lien on his client's cause of action, precluded a contra holding.
No third party liability statute of any other state seems to have word-
ing similar to this, and uniformly in those states It appears that costs
and attorney's fees are first subtracted from the gross recovery. Sears
vs. Inhabitants of Town of Nahaut, (1913) 215 Mass. 234, 102 N. E.
491, passing on the general question involved, held that the purpose of
"expenses shall be borne by the employee" is to protect the employer
in needless and fruitless litigation, but not "to evade or defeat a rea-
sonable and just claim for compensation due an attorney" who has
successfully recovered and in which the defendant shares. Similar
holdings appear in Haymor vs. Morris, (1942), 37 N.Y. S. (2d) 884;
Conway vs. Skidmore, (1935) 48 Wyo. 73, 41 P. (2d) 1049; Delaware
L. & W. Ry. Co. vs. Fengler, (1942) 288 N. Y. 141, 42 N. E. (2d) 6;
and Aetna Life Ins. Co. vs. Bowling Green Gaslight Co. (1912) 150
Ky. 732, 150 S. W. 994. These cases are thought to express the correct
view.
Of course, by virtue of the express provision of §2893 quoted
above, the employee must, in Montana, bear the expenses of the action
other than attorney's fees.
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law, or one-half (1/2) of the amount received and paid to
such employee in settlement of, or by judgment in said ac-
tion, whichever is the lesser amount."
It is thus apparent that the amendment leaves unchanged
the wording carried over from the original provision, which, it
is submitted, is likely fore-doomed to the construction given it
by the Court in the Butler case. The only change has been
that of an alternative. It is true that this alternative would
give the employer a more just recompense were it not for the
qualifying phrase "whichever is the lesser amount." Mani-
festly, rare instances would occur when a common law recovery
against a third person would amount to less than the typical
awards of compensation actually received within six months.
And it is also clear, because of this phrase, that when the al-
ternative does operate, the employer is due to receive less than
he would under the unamended statute.
Assuming that Section 2839 as amended should be sub-
jected to the construction given it in the Butler case, analysis
together with corresponding statutes of other states reveals
singular contrasts.
Let us assume that the injured employee is suing within
six months, and that he has contracted with his attorney for a
25% contingent fee; that costs of court are 5%, and that the
employee has actually received $720.00 ($30 per week for six
months) from his employer.
Now, under a generous recovery of $50,000, in Montana
the attorney will take $12,500. Since the $720 received as
compensation from the employer is less than the third party
recovery, the employer will take 1/2 of that amount, or $360.
This leaves $37,140. Minus costs, being 5% of $50.000, or
$2500, the employee's net recovery is $34,640.
Under an intermediate recovery of $15,000, the attorney
takes $3750, leaving $11,250. The employer takes his constant
$360, which, substract~d with costs of $750, leaves the em-
ployee $10,140.
Under a modest recovery of $2000, attorney's fees take
$500, the employer takes $360, and, after subtracting costs of
$100, the employee still comes through with$1040.
Even when the third party recovery is less than the
amount received as compensation under the act, the employee
is fairly certain to come out of the fray with a share smaller
only by the costs of court-as, for instance, assuming a recov-
ery of $500. Under the holding of the Butler case, the fee of
plaintiff's attorney in the sum of $125 would have to be de-
6
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ducted first, leaving $375. Of this amount, the employer
would take one-half, or $187.50, leaving a residue of $162.50
for the employee and $25 as costs of court.
As previously indicated, Montana has no rival in this de-
gree of generosity toward the injured employee. Of the 20
states granting simultaneous third party recovery, only Wis-
consin and Arkansas join Montana in guaranteeing the em-
ployee a percentage of such recovery. But even those states
pay at least lip service to the employer's full subrogation.
Wisconsin's plan provides for the following distribution: first,
reasonable costs of collection are subtracted from the third
party recovery; second, one-third of the remainder goes to
the injured employee; third, the employer takes up to the full
amount of his liability from the remainder; fourth, any re-
mainder goes to the employee.
Tested under the same hypothetical facts as the Montana
statute before, the following results seem to obtain in Wiscon-
sin:
$50,000 Recovery:
Costs: (5% of $50,000) ............................
...... $15,000.00
Attorney's fees: (25% ) ........................ J
Employee: (1/3 of $35,000) ---------------.......... 11,666.66
Employer: (Amount of liability
for compensation) --------------- 8,000.00
Employee: (Remainder) ..................-- ---- ------ 15,333.34
$50,000.00
$15,000 Recovery:
C osts ...........................................................
...... $ 4,500.00
Attorney's fees ...... ................................ J
Employee -------------------------------------------------------- 3,500.00
Employer (All up to $8,000) ---------------------- 7,000.00
$15,000.00
$2000 Recovery:
C osts- ..........................................................
...... $ 600.00
A ttorney's fees .......................................... J
Employee----- ...................................................... 466.66
Em ployer ............................................................ 933.34
$ 2,000.00
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The third type of statute, of which Illinois is typical, yields
these results under our assumed recoveries. Illinois differs
from Wisconsin, as previously noted, in that the injured em-
ployee is not guaranteed a percentage of the third party re-
covery if he accepts compensation from the employer.
$50,000 Recovery:Costs ...........................................-
Coss -------------------------------------------------- $5000...... 15,0 0.00
Attorney's fees --------------- ........ ------------------ J
Employer -------------------------.................................. 8,000.00
Em ployee ............................................................ 27,000.00
$50,000.00
$15,000 Recovery:
C osts ............................................................ 1
.... $ 4,500.00
Attorney's fees ---------------................................ 
J
Employer ...........-- -- -------------------------------------....... 8,000.00
Employee ---------------------------------------------------- --- 2,500.00
$15,000.00
$2000 Recovery:
Costs-------------------------------------------I----$ 600oss... $ 600.00
Attorney's fees ..--- ..................------------------- J
Employer -----------.- ..................----------------------------- 1,400.00
Employee --------------------------------------------------------- 000.00
$ 2,000.00'
Thus, on recapitulation, it appears that under a $50,000
third party recovery, the employee will receive $34,640 in Mon-
tana, but $27,000 in Wisconsin or Illinois. The employer will
receive $360 in Montana, but his full $8,000 were he in either
of the other two states. Under a $15,000 recovery, the em-
ployee takes $10,140 in Montana, $3500 in Wisconsin, or $2500.
in Illinois. The employer receives his $360 in Montana, but re-
covers $7000 in Wisconsin, and $8000 in Illinois. Under a
$2000 recovery, the employee has $1040 in Montana, $466.66 in
Wisconsin, but he receives nothing in Illinois, while the em-
ployer still receives his $360 in Montana, $933.34 in Wisconsin,.
and $1400 in Illinois.
Which statute is preferable? It is believed that this can
best be determined with reference to the objects of the Work-
8
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men's Compensation laws. Authorities list the following as the
principal objectives:"
1. Immediate medical or hospital service for the injured
employee, and a prompt commencement of compen-
sation payments.
2. Full payment of compensation in accordance with the
terms of the act.
3. To standardize and define the liability of the employ-
er, allowing fullest possible reimbursement when to
do so will not defeat other purposes of the act.,
4. To return the injured employee to work as soon as
possible."
Undoubtedly, all three statutes satisfy the first two re-
quirements. On the third objective, however, differences arise-
Mr. Dodd, an eminent writer on Workmen's Compensation,
maintains that "the employer should in all cases be reim-
bursed, so far as such reimbursement is possible, from dam-
ages collected from the third party.'" The Illinois statute
seems highly satisfactory on this point, for the employer is
the first to be compensated from the recovery after reasonable
expenses have been deducted. Wisconsin, too, allows full reim-
bursement to the employer, but the recovery must be one third
greater in order to satisfy the employee's prior lien of that
amount. Montana's statute, in its construction most favorable
to the employer, would allow only 50% reimbursement.
Bearing in mind that liability under the Workmen's Com-
pensation laws is placed on the employer without reference to
fault, it seems clear that in theory, at least, he should be reim-
bursed in full when the size of the third party recovery per-
mits. However, intervening practical factors seem to recom-
mend a modification of this theory: first, even though the em-
ployee may be entitled to a sizeable recovery, he usually is dis-
couraged from prosecuting the action aggressively since the
employer takes first such a large share; second, there is a
"op. cit. Note 3.
'*Concerning the fourth requirement, much speculation arises. It might
be argued that in Illinois where there is less hope for a substantial re-
covery from the third party, that the employee will be less inclined
to play up his injuries for the sympathy of the jury than he would in
Wisconsin. But probably in either jurisdiction the employee will be
equally tempted to struggle along on his compensation to gamble on
the contingency, no matter how nebulous, of a large common law re-
covery. This condition would seem to exist in any case when a third
party action is allowed.
See DODD, ADMINISTRATION OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION, pp. 614-16.
'id. p. 615.
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strong tendency for the employer, who is ordinarily the ag-
gressor even though he may be suing jointly with, or in the
name of the employee, to settle for the amount of compensation
payable. It is sometimes argued that an employee injured by
a third party in receiving compensation should be no better off
than any other employee with identical injuries sustained in
another manner, and that any recovery over and above com-
pensation should go into a separate compensation fund. But
this view perhaps overlooks the practical difficulties of a
stranger to the employee or his estate trying to recover dam-
ages for injuries sustained by a person who is not to receive
the benefit of the recovery. Further, much is to be said for
the argument that such cause of action against a third person
is a personal matter, as in the case of insurance, over which
the injured person should have control, subject only to the em-
ployer's lien for compensation. In any event, the third party
should not be allowed to profit by his injurious wrong. If it
be agreed that the employee should be unfettered in pushing
his claim against the tortious third party, then it would appear
that these obstacles incident to the Illinois type of plan must
be circumvented. It was on this theory of giving added in-
centive to the employee to prosecute aggressively, that Wiscon-
sin, the recognized leader among the states in labor benefit
legislation, adopted the plan of guaranteeing the employee one-
third of the third party recovery. Even more, this plan in-
duces the employer to an aggressive prosecution in the hope
that his 2/3 portion will defray compensation liability, and
thus eliminate the tendency to settle for less. Even though,
as Dodd points out, this plan tends to "penalize the employer
by preventing full third party reimbursement in a large num-
ber of cases,' it probably compromises the difficulties better
than any other. The Montana plan, by allowing the employee
exclusive control of the cause of action if acted on within six
months, which carries with it an absolute gift of compensa-
tion payable to him, gives the employee a driving incentive, to
be sure, but robs the employer almost entirely of his.
In conclusion, it is respectfully submitted that the wiser
solution to this problem is the repeal of Section 2839 in toto
and the adoption of a plan in the nature of that of Wiscon-
sin. If not that, then certainly, when a set of facts similar to
the Butler case next arises before the Montana Supreme Court,
that body should strive to find that "amount received" and
"amount paid" as appear in Section 2839 were intended to
2id. p. 614.
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mean "amount receivable" and "amount payable" as compen-
sation under the Act. L. Lloyd Evans.
Book Review
THE ANATOMY OF PEACE
By Emery Reves. Fifth Edition
Harper & Brothers, New York and London, 1945.
pp. 0 - 275 $2.00
The lawyer should be more than ordinarily interested in
Emery Reves' recent essay, "The Anatomy of Peace," for at
least two reasons: 1. The praise the author heaps on law, at
at least the "legal order" as a civilizing agency should appeal
to his professional pride; 2. The extensive list of responsible
signatures appearing under an open letter to the public recent-
ly, urging everyone to read it and discuss it should challenge his
interest as a citizen. Its extremely controversial character is at-
tested to by two articles dealing with it carried in the Amer-
ican Bar Association Journal in very recent issues.
Most students of the subject have long recognized the evil
effects flowing from nationalism run rampant, in the interna-
tional area, however beneficial it may have been in earlier
times. Reves brings to this subject both the creative thinking
of a scientist (most of the time) and the zeal of a reformer, to
give us an almost overwhelming argument in support of a
"universal government." Briefly, he develops his thesis as
follows.
At all times peace in the political realm has been accom-
plished only by bringing larger and larger groups of persons
and of land areas under the rule of a single authoritative
source of law. The peace resulting from this integration of
conflicting groups has lasted only so long as the resulting heg-
emony did not come into extensive contact with some other
hegemony. As soon as this happened, conflict again developed.
Not only was this true of such countries as the British Isles,
different portions of Europe and of the Western Hemisphere,
but it was true in ancient times as well. At one time, develop-
ing large areas into nations resolved many conflicts. Now,
however, because of continuous development in technology,
there is constant contact and consequent friction between all
nations in the world. This results in an anxiety in each nation
to be "secure" from every other one. The very anxiety for
security guarantees further wars.
In the economic realm nationalism engenders war in at
11
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